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a b s t r a c t
Two different approaches for fault detection, the geometric and the detection ﬁlter based methods, are
compared in the paper from practical aspects, using the linear parameter-varying (LPV) framework.
Presenting two designs allows a comparison of global, system level, and local component level fault
detection methods with special emphasis on their relevance to aircraft industry. Practical engineering
design decisions are highlighted via applying them to a high-ﬁdelity commercial aircraft problem.
The successive steps of the design, including fault modeling, LPV model generation, and LPV FDI ﬁlter
synthesis, including implementation aspects, are discussed. Results are presented according to the
industrial assessment perspectives phrased within the EU ADDSAFE project.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Modern ﬂy-by-wire aircraft ﬂight control systems are becoming
more complex with many actuators controlling several aerodynamic
surfaces. While performance goals, including aerodynamic drag
minimization and structural design optimization, are becoming
more and more important, ﬂight must be kept at the same highest
safety level. In parallel, there is a clear trend towards the More-
Electric Aircraft. Recently, Airbus introduced on the A380 a new
hydraulics layout (Van den Bossche, 2006), where the three hydrau-
lics circuitry is replaced by a two hydraulics plus two electric layout,
which saves signiﬁcant mass for the aircraft. Each primary surface
has a single hydraulically powered actuator and electrically powered
back-up with the exception of the outer aileron, which uses the two
hydraulic systems together. Consequently, the trends of complexity
and more-electric architectures, like electromechanical actuators
(EMA) with more fault sources, raise the importance of availability,
reliability and operating safety, while all aircraft manufacturers must
be compliant with stringent safety regulations of FAA, EASA and
other aviation authorities. The newer societal imperatives towards
an environmentally friendlier aircraft, with still the highest level of
safety and reliability, can only be achieved with advanced on-line
supervision and fault diagnosis methods relying on analytical
redundancy. The traditional approach to fault diagnosis in the wider
application context is based on hardware redundancy methods
which use multiple sensors, actuators computers and software to
measure and control a particular variable (Goupil, 2011). Based on
the mathematical model of the plant, analytical relation between
different sensor outputs can be used to generate diagnostics signals,
often called residuals. There is a growing interest in methods which
do not require additional hardware redundancy, and only rely on the
ever increasing level of computational power onboard the aircraft.
In analytical redundancy schemes, the resulting difference
generated from the consistency checking of different variables is
called residual signal. The residual should be zero when the system
is normal, and should diverge from zero when a fault occurs in the
system. This zero and non-zero property of the residual is used to
determine whether or not faults have occurred. Analytical redun-
dancy makes use of a quantitative mathematical model of the
system, and the goal is the determination of faults from the
comparison of available system measurements with a priori infor-
mation represented by the mathematical model, through genera-
tion of residual quantities and their analysis. In parallel with the
residual generation the analytical redundancy within the systems
can be used to generate virtual sensors, which can complement
the set of physically redundant sensors. Various approaches have
been applied to the residual generation problem, the parity space
approach (Chow & Willsky, 1984), the multiple model method
(Chang & Athans, 1978), detection ﬁlter design using a geometric
approach (Massoumnia, 1986), frequency domain concepts (Frank,
1990), unknown input observer concept (Chen & Patton, 1999),
dynamic inversion based detection (Edelmayer, Bokor, & Szabo,
2003), sliding mode observers (Alwi, Edwards, & Marcos, 2010),
extended Kalman ﬁlter based parameter estimation (Eykeren, Chu,
& Mulder, 2012) and using rational nullspace bases (Varga, 2003).
Most of these design approaches refer to linear time-invariant (LTI)
systems. The geometric concept is further generalized to linear
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parameter-varying (LPV) systems by Balas, Bokor, and Szabo (2003),
while input afﬁne nonlinear systems are considered by De Persis,
De Santis, and Isidori (2001). The basic concepts underlying
observer-based fault detection and isolation (FDI) schemes are
the generation of residuals and the use of an optimal or adaptive
threshold function to differentiate faults from disturbances, as
surveyed in Frank (1990) and Patton and Chen (1996). The threshold
function is used to robustify the detection of the fault by minimiz-
ing the possibility of false alarms and missed detections. The effect
of disturbances and model uncertainty have to be minimized on the
residuals. For fault isolation, the generated residual has to include
enough information to differentiate said fault from another, which
is accomplished through structured residuals or directional vectors.
Robustness of the FDI algorithm is determined by its capability to
decouple the ﬁlter performance outputs from disturbances, errors,
and unmodelled dynamics.
Advanced design methods relying on the robust control machin-
ery tend to be very complex and difﬁcult to implement in practical
engineering systems, hence it is important to show the applicability
of different methods and their corresponding computational com-
plexity relative to the requirements of an aircraft manufacturer. The
importance of this paper is on the comparison of the global (aircraft
level) and local (component level) methods with respect to their
detection performance, development complexity and implementa-
tion aspects. An aileron fault detection case is handled by a geo-
metric FDI ﬁlter (Vanek, Szabó, Edelmayer, & Bokor, 2011) using an
aircraft level mathematical model, while the elevator fault detection
is tackled by a more conventional detection ﬁlter based approach
(Vanek, Szabó, Edelmayer, & Bokor, 2012) using the local mathema-
tical description of the hydraulic actuator.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the basic concepts of geometric and detection ﬁlter based
fault detection ﬁlter design. The motivating example, a civil
aircraft, is described in Section 3. The methods are applied to the
high ﬁdelity aircraft example, which demonstrates the proposed
approach, given in Section 4. The lessons learnt during coding the
algorithms in hardware ready implementation are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. LPV FDI
There are a number of analytical redundancy based FDI methods
available in the literature for linear and nonlinear systems. While
recent nonlinear approaches are useful for the analysis, and partly
for the design of detection ﬁlters, they are largely incapable of
solving synthesis problems due to the computational burden they
usually pose for the implementation. LPV modeling is known to be a
capable approach to alleviate this problem; it has been useful in
many areas of control and ﬁltering in handling nonlinear problems.
The idea suggests that a broad class of nonlinear system models can
be converted into a quasi-linear form (Tan, 1997), obtaining the so-
called quasi-linear parameter-varying (qLPV) representation. The
state-space matrices depend afﬁnely on a parameter vector in qLPV
systems. This approach is particularly appealing when the nonlinear
plant can be considered as linear one assuming the presence of a set
of time varying scheduling parameters in the system matrices. The
parameters are thought not necessarily known at the design stage
but always measurable real-time. This class of systems can be
described as
_xðtÞ ¼ AðρÞxðtÞþBðρÞuðtÞþ ∑
m
j ¼ 1
LjðρÞf jðtÞ
yðtÞ ¼ CðρÞxðtÞþDðρÞuðtÞþ ∑
m
j ¼ 1
MjðρÞf jðtÞ ð1Þ
where x(t) is the state vector, u(t) is the input vector and y(t) is the
output vector of the system, while there are j different failure
signals fj affecting the system, the AðρÞ;BðρÞ;CðρÞ;DðρÞ matrices are
parameter dependent. Lj are the directions of the faults acting on
the input, most often on the actuators, whileMj are the output fault
directions most often acting on the sensors. In a particular FDI ﬁlter
synthesis problem the goal is to detect a subset of these faults and
being insensitive to the rest of them.
2.1. Geometric LPV FDI
The geometric design approach (Bokor & Balas, 2004;
Massoumnia, 1986) is known for its excellent fault isolation, fault
reconstruction and sensitivity properties under small modeling
uncertainty and noise. Vanek, Szabo et al. (2011) show the appli-
cation of the geometric LPV FDI approach to a complex, 6 degrees-
of-freedom (DOF) rigid body aircraft model. Previous approaches
(Khong & Shin, 2007; Szaszi, Marcos, Balas, & Bokor, 2005) only
considered the longitudinal dynamics of the airplane, which is
applicable for the elevator fault detection case but as described in
Vanek, Seiler, Bokor, and Balas (2011) designs based on decoupled
dynamics are inherently limited to detection around the trim
(cruise) ﬂight condition and might be less robust to deviation from
the trim operating point.
The derivation of the geometric FDI ﬁlter solving the funda-
mental problem of residual generation (FPRG) is brieﬂy presented
for the LTI case (Massoumnia, 1986) with no disturbance, no
uncertainty and the detection and isolation of two faults, for
illustration purposes. The LPV synthesis can be found in Balas
et al. (2003).
Consider the LTI system with two additive actuator faults:
_xðtÞ ¼ AxðtÞþBuðtÞþL1f 1ðtÞþL2f 2ðtÞ
yðtÞ ¼ CxðtÞ ð2Þ
where L1 and L2 represent the fault directions in the state space. f1
and f2 are the fault signals. The fault signals are zero if there is no
fault but nonzero if the particular fault occurs. Only actuator faults
are considered here but sensor faults can also be considered within
the theory. The FPRG can be phrased as synthesizing residual
generators (ﬁlters) with outputs ri (i¼1,2) that have the following
decoupling property: ri is sensitive to fi but insensitive to fj, ia j.
More precisely, if fi¼0 then limt-1riðtÞ ¼ 0 and if f ia0 then ria0.
The solution of this problem depends on the (C,A)-invariant
subspaces and certain unobservability subspaces (Massoumnia,
1986). A (C, A)-unobservability subspace S is a subspace such that
there exist matrices G and H with the property that S is the
maximal ðAþGCÞ invariant subspace contained in Ker HC. The
family of (C,A)-unobservability subspaces containing a given set L
has a minimal element. Deﬁne Li ¼ Im Li (i¼ 1;2) and denote by
Sn the smallest unobservability subspace containing L2. Then the
fundamental problem of residual generation has a solution if and
only if Sn \ L1 ¼ 0 (Massoumnia, Verghese, & Willsky, 1989). The
condition Sn \ L1 ¼ 0 ensures that the fault to be detected is not
hidden in the unobservability subspace of the detection ﬁlter. In
fact, the fault direction will be decoupled from the rest of the fault
directions since they are contained in the unobservability sub-
space of the residual generator. This result can be extended to LPV
systems (Balas et al., 2003) and to nonlinear input afﬁne systems
(De Persis et al., 2001).
The residual generator associated with fault direction L1 can be
described by an observer of the following form:
_wðtÞ ¼NwðtÞGyðtÞþFuðtÞ
r1ðtÞ ¼MwðtÞHyðtÞ ð3Þ
where u and y are the known input and measured output signals
of the original LTI system. w is the state vector of the residual
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generator and r1 is the residual. The state space matrices can be
determined as follows (Massoumnia, 1986). H is a solution of the
equation Ker HC¼Ker CþSn, and M is the unique solution of
MP¼HC, where P is a projection operator mapping the entire state
space into a factor space with special properties P : X-X=Sn.
Consider a gain matrix G^ chosen such that ðAþ G^CÞSnDSn and
deﬁne A^ ¼ PðAþGCÞPT . A^ is not necessarily Hurwitz. To obtain
quadratically stable ﬁlters one can set N¼ A^þ ~GM, where ~G≔X1K
and X, K are determined from the linear matrix inequality (LMI):
0≽A^
T
XþXA^þMTKTþKM ð4Þ
0X ¼ XT ð5Þ
Then set G¼ PG^þ ~GH and F¼PB. Using this approach there are as
many ﬁlters as faults to detect, and their state dimensions are
equal to the consecutive dimensions of the factor spaces X=Sn. The
ﬁlter poles can be tuned by suitable output injection, which is
formulated as imposing constraints in the LMIs above, resulting in
perfect reconstruction of fault signals fi. One issue is that the ﬁlter
design does not consider model uncertainty and the fault detec-
tion performance may not be robust. It is a standard procedure to
pose the FDI ﬁlter design problem as an H1 optimization (Marcos,
Ganguli, & Balas, 2005), which uses robust control methods. In the
one-step robust H1 optimization approach fault reconstruction is
achieved as a model matching problem in one step, without exact
decoupling properties, and approximate disturbance decoupling
is achieved in the H1 optimal sense. On the other hand the
geometric (FPRG) approach is able to provide exact decoupling
between the fault(s) and the disturbances, but the resulting FPRG
ﬁlter dynamics might not be optimal for the detection purpose. To
overcome this weakness of the geometric approach, the FPRG ﬁlter
can be augmented with a post-ﬁlter (Vanek, Szabo et al., 2011), as
shown in Fig. 1, where the dynamics of the FPRG ﬁlter is shaped
with suitable output injection o. Fault reconstruction is achieved
with model matching using the H1 optimal ﬁlter FDIh 1, which
uses the independent outputs of the FPRG ﬁlter rf, and generates a
residual rs which tracks the ideal fault response fid. The main
advantage of this approach is that elements of rf are all decoupled
from the disturbances and hence the ﬁlter FDIh 1 only acts on the
signals which are sensitive to the faults and can be fed back to
shape the dynamics of the FPRG ﬁlter, moreover it is often not
feasible to solve the LPV H1 problem for large plants, but the
geometric LPV FPRG ﬁlter requires only algebraic computations
and no optimization is involved. It is shown in Seiler, Vanek, Bokor,
and Balas (2011) that the design has an interesting self-optimality
property for input multiplicative uncertainty sets. Speciﬁcally, the
ﬁlter designed on the nominal plant is the optimal ﬁlter in the
robust model matching problem assuming input multiplicative
uncertainty.
2.2. Detection ﬁlter based LPV FDI
The basic idea behind the LTI observer based approaches is to
estimate the outputs of the system from the measurements by
using a Luenberger observer, assuming a deterministic setting or
a Kalman ﬁlter in the stochastic case. Then the weighted output
estimation error is used as a residual. The ﬂexibility in selecting
observer gains and designing static or time varying thresholding
functions is fully exploited in the literature (Frank, Ding, &
Kop̈pen-Seliger, 2000). The interest is in LPV FDI, which is a
generalization of the LTI case, where the goal is the estimation
of the outputs using an observer, whilst the estimation of the state
vector is unnecessary. As a matter of fact, a functional observer is
suitable for this task. In practice, the order of the functional
observer is less than the order of the state observer. It is desired
to estimate the output, a linear (parameter-varying) function
of the state, i.e. CðρÞxðtÞ, using a functional or generalized LPV
Luenberger-like observer with the following structure:
_zðtÞ ¼ FðρÞzðtÞþKðρÞyðtÞþ JðρÞuðtÞ ð6Þ
wðtÞ ¼ GðρÞzðtÞþRðρÞyðtÞþSðρÞuðtÞ ð7Þ
y^ðtÞ ¼wðtÞþDðρÞuðtÞ ð8Þ
rðtÞ ¼ Q ½yðtÞ y^ðtÞ ¼Q1ðρÞzðtÞþQ2ðρÞyðtÞþQ3ðρÞuðtÞ ð9Þ
where zðtÞARq is the state vector of the functional observer, F, K, J,
R, G and S are matrices with appropriate dimensions. The output w
(t) of this observer is said to be an estimate of CðρÞxðtÞ, the output
of the system without the feedthrough term, for the system in
Eq. (1), in an asymptotic sense in the absence of faults. The
residual r(t) is generated based on the states of the observer,
where the Qi entries are free parameters, but have to satisfy the
following set of equations (Chen & Patton, 1999):
eigðFðρÞÞo0 ð10Þ
TAðρÞFðρÞT ¼ KðρÞC ð11Þ
JðρÞ ¼ TBðρÞKðρÞD ð12Þ
Q1ðρÞTþQ2ðρÞC ¼ 0 ð13Þ
Q3ðρÞþQ2ðρÞD¼ 0 ð14Þ
where T is a coordinate transformation matrix, which can be
constant if C and D in Eq. (1) are also constant. It can be seen that
the residual depends solely on faults in the asymptotic sense,
given a stable estimator dynamics.
3. Mathematical model of the aircraft
A global aircraft level mathematical model is derived for the
aileron fault detection problem, since only a single measurement
of surface deﬂection is available for FDI purposes. On the other
hand, in the elevator fault detection problem a local model is able
to provide the required analytical redundancy, since three inde-
pendent measurements can be used for residual generation.
3.1. General aircraft characteristics
The aircraft model used in this paper is a generic civil aircraft
from Airbus. A high-ﬁdelity aerodynamic database, propriety of
Airbus Operations S.A.S, is used within the project, but results in
the present paper are normalised due to conﬁdentiality reasons.
The aircraft has two engines and a nominal weight of 200 tons.
Some of its performance at cruise ﬂight condition are speed of
240 knots, altitude of 30 000 ft. The aircraft has 19 control inputs,
Fig. 1. Geometric FPRG ﬁlter with H1 augmentation in the model matching
framework.
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and measurement of 6-DOF motion with load factor (nx;ny;nz),
body rate (p; q; r), velocity (VT), aerodynamic angles (α;β), position
(X;Y ; Z) and attitude (ϕ;θ;ψ ) outputs. The inputs are standard left
and right engine throttle; airbrake (which is disabled at cruise
ﬂight condition), left and right internal and external ailerons, six
spoilers on each side, left and right elevators, rudder and trim-
mable horizontal stabilizer which is used mainly for trimming
purposes. The nonlinear body-axes rigid body dynamics includes
12 states: p; q; r body rates, u; v;w velocities all in body axes, ϕ;θ;ψ
Euler angles, representing the rotation between the body and
inertial axes, and X;Y ; Z positions in the north-east-down coordi-
nate frame, assuming ﬂat Earth for simplicity. The rigid body
aircraft model is augmented with nonlinear actuator and sensor
models on all input and output channels (Goupil, 2011) .
3.2. Deriving a reliable LPV model of the aircraft
The ADDSAFE benchmark aircraft model is given in a nonlinear
simulation, where several components are given as black-box
models. Aerodynamic coefﬁcients are represented by trained
neural-networks, for which it is not possible to derive afﬁne LPV
models in the form of Eq. (2) analytically. Based on the required
operating envelope it is decided to have weight (m), center of
gravity position (c.g.), altitude above sea level (h), and calibrated
airspeed (Vcas) as scheduling variables. The nonlinear model is
then trimmed and linearized at different points of the operating
envelope to obtain pointwise LTI models.
The LTI models of the aircraft are obtained at level ﬂight, with
p¼ q¼ r¼ 0 rad=s, vx ¼ const: m=s, vy ¼ 0 m=s, vz ¼ const: m=s, at
various altitudes, see Vanek, Seiler et al. (2011) for details. The
airbrake, which is disabled at high Mach numbers, is removed
from the control inputs since it has no effect on the aircraft. The
model used for trim is an open-loop model without the onboard
controller implemented in the ﬂight control computer (FCC), since
actuators and sensors are assumed to have unit steady state gain
and low-pass characteristics, their dynamics are omitted. Trim is
obtained with zero aileron, rudder and elevator deﬂection, left and
right engines are providing the same amount of thrust to balance
the yawing motion. Pitch axis trim is obtained with the trimmable
horizontal stabilizer, while the aircraft has a constant angle-of-
attack.
The pointwise LTI systems have nine states, since the fault
detection problem is invariant of X;Y positions and ψ heading
angle. All systems are stable, which is necessary for estimator
based FDI techniques. After investigation of the FCC commands,
assuming faults appear only on the aileron, elevator, and rudder
channels, the inputs of the system are simpliﬁed. The two engines
are receiving the same commands, the spoilers have a ﬁxed
coupling, the two elevators are also moving in unison, hence the
number of inputs can be reduced to 9, namely pi engine; δa;IL
Aileron internal left; δa;IR Aileron internal right; δa;EL Ail external
left; δa;ER Ail external right; δsp Spoiler; δe Elevator; δr Rudder; and
δTHS trimmable horizontal stabilizer. The resulting LTI models are
augmented with ﬁrst-order sensor and actuator dynamics derived
from the high-ﬁdelity simulation, to account for their effect on
the aircraft behavior and also three directional wind disturbance
is perturbing the model via Dryden wind gust ﬁlters. These LTI
models are then approximated by an afﬁne LPV model using the
DLR proprietary LFR toolbox. The procedure is described in detail
in Hecker (2006).
When obtaining the LPV representation, several simplifying
assumptions are made to reduce the problem size. The LPV model
is an open-loop approximation, with ﬁrst-order afﬁne dependence
on the four scheduling parameters, without the control loop in
feedback, since the complexity of the Airbus proprietary control
logic is beyond tractable size. This leads to a conservative system
description for FDI synthesis, since non-feasible system state
trajectories have to be handled also. Moreover, trim input and
output values are also computed at the operating points and
interpolated linearly between them when simulating the LPV
dynamics. When the nonlinear aircraft characteristics is compared
to the behavior of the corresponding LPV A/C model the sche-
matics used in Fig. 2 is used to account for the appropriate match.
The scenario under investigation is a left inboard aileron fault. To
account for this fault, and to be able to consider additional faults
as disturbances, the original afﬁne LPV system description of the
aircraft is augmented with additional fault directions as in Eq. (2):
_xðtÞ ¼ AðρðtÞÞxðtÞþBðρðtÞÞuðtÞþL1ðρðtÞÞf a;ILðtÞ
þL2ðρðtÞÞf e;LðtÞþL3ðρðtÞÞf rðtÞ ð15Þ
~yðtÞ ¼ ~CxðtÞ ð16Þ
where L1ðρðtÞÞ ¼ Bð2; :ÞðρðtÞÞ is the corresponding column of the
control effectiveness matrix of the left inboard aileron. L2ðρðtÞÞ ¼
0:5Bð7; :ÞðρðtÞÞ corresponds to the left elevator control effectiveness,
while L3ðρðtÞÞ ¼ Bð8; :ÞðρðtÞÞ is the column of the rudder control
effectiveness. It is important to note that although the interest is in
detecting left internal aileron faults, the effect of additional actuator
faults is also included. It is necessary to include them, since in the
design stage the goal is not only to design an FDI ﬁlter which is
sensitive to faults in the direction of L1, but also to provide good
isolation and to keep false alarm rate low, which is accomplished by
the ﬁlter being insensitive to additional faults characterized by the
directions of L2 and L3. On the other hand, adding more disturbance
inputs to the augmented plant does not provide additional beneﬁts,
since the right aileron has exactly the same B matrix as the left
aileron with an opposite sign, hence these two faults are indis-
tinguishable. The outer ailerons are creating a similar effect on the
aircraft and are virtually identical to the inner ailerons when the
measurements are corrupted by noise and system uncertainty.
The left and the right elevator are merged into one input, but
originally they have also the same column in their control effective-
ness matrix. Although spoiler runaway can have a signiﬁcant effect
at high speed, the response is still smaller than a runaway of a
primary control surface, hence spoilers are omitted from the
investigation. Engines have signiﬁcantly slower dynamics than the
ﬂight control surfaces and their diagnostics is well established
within their full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) system,
hence engines are also assumed fault free within this study.
It is also important to note that only a subset of sensor
measurement outputs ð ~yÞ are selected (by ~C ) for the fault detection
problem. Load factor has direct feedthrough from actuator inputs
resulting in nonzero D matrix, which is difﬁcult to handle in the
geometric FDI framework, even after ﬁltering with actuator and
sensor dynamics, hence these measurements are omitted.
The various fault scenarios to be investigated are disconnection,
jamming and bias on the aileron actuator. In case of disconnection,
the aileron surface goes to the null hinge moment position dictated
by the aerodynamic forces acting on it, which is at a constant angle
δeNHM. The failure signal is deﬁned as f a;i;LðtÞ ¼ δNHMe ua;i;LðtÞ. The
other scenario is liquid jamming, when a bias bl;j occurs on
the actuator rod sensor, and hence on the rod position relative to
Fig. 2. Interconnection of the LPV rigid body equations with a sensor and actuator
model.
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the commanded deﬂection. This can be captured by a fault signal
of f a;i;LðtÞ ¼ bl;j. The third case is called solid jamming, when the
actuator is stuck at a given position bs;j and does not move, this is
similar to the ﬁrst scenario, only the offset is not δeMIN but some other
quantity bs;j.
3.3. Nonlinear elevator actuator model
The limited set of measurements on the aileron, only the
actuator rod position is sent back to the FCC, makes it very difﬁcult
to apply the local model based FDI. On the other hand, in case of
the elevator the 3 independent signals of servo valve position ðysvÞ,
rod position ðyrodÞ and surface deﬂection ðysurf Þ allow more analytic
redundancy, suitable for local model based methods (see Fig. 3).
The actuator model is based on the physical equation used to
estimate the actuator rod speed as a function of the hydraulic
pressure delivered to the actuator, and is a function of the external
forces acting on the control surface and reacted by the actuator
(Andrieu, 1999). The estimated position p^ results from a discrete
integration (trapezoidal method) of this estimated velocity (v^). The
two main contributors are the aerodynamic force (which depends
also on p^) and the servo-control load in a damping mode of the
adjacent passive actuator (actuators are installed in dual conﬁg-
uration to most of the ﬂight control surfaces, see Goupil, 2010 for
more details). The actuator rod speed is expressed as
v^ ¼ v^c
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ΔP Faeroþ FdampingS
ΔPref
vuut ð17Þ
whereΔP is the hydraulic pressure really delivered to the actuator.
Faero represents the aerodynamic forces applied on the control
surface. The corresponding model is not detailed here for con-
ﬁdentiality reasons, only a low-order representation of it is
detailed without the servo valve dynamics, which is sufﬁcient to
capture its main behavior. Fdamping represents the servo-control
load of the adjacent actuator in the damping mode, which always
acts against the required motion (vc), hence always positive:
Fdamping ¼ Kdv^2 ð18Þ
Kd is the actuator damping coefﬁcient and v^ represents the speed
to be estimated, S is the actuator piston surface area, ΔPref is the
differential pressure corresponding to the maximum rod speed.
This speed is reached when the servo valve is fully opened, i.e.
when ΔP ¼ΔPref . v^c is the rod speed computed by the ﬂight
control computer. It corresponds to the maximal speed of one
actuator alone with no load.
The actuator rod position is obtained using the integration of
the rod speed. In case of the elevator, the geometric deﬂection of
the ﬂight control surface is measured (ysurf), which is directly
related to the rod position via a static nonlinear relation, which
is also measured (yrod), as shown in Fig. 3. While the servo valve
position, used for the control of the hydraulic circuit, is also
available for measurement (ysv).
3.4. LPV aircraft actuator model
As described above, the actuator servo-loop has position
commands δeCMD, while measurement of three signals (ysurf ; yrod;
ysv) are available, where the real measurements of ysurf are
associated with their model of δe. The model structure is com-
posed of two main blocks, as shown in Fig. 4, a static nonlinear
mapping and a parameter-dependent dynamics leading to a
Hammerstein-type representation. The aerodynamic forces ðFaeroÞ
acting on the elevator surface are assumed to be represented by a
static nonlinear mapping as a function of elevator deﬂection ðδeÞ,
trimmable horizontal stabilizer deﬂection ðδTHSÞ, angle-of-attack
ðαÞ, dynamic pressure ðPdÞ, and Mach number ðMÞ. Based on the
Airbus conﬁdential high ﬁdelity Faero model, a low-order poly-
nomial representation is derived as a function of the variables:
Faero ¼ CδðδC0ÞþCδ2ðδC0Þ2þCTHSTHSþCαα
Cδ ¼ C1Pd; Cδ2 ¼ C2Pd; CTHS ¼ C3Pd; Cα ¼ C4Pd
C1 ¼ C11ðMÞþC12ðMÞM; C2 ¼ C21ðMÞþC22ðMÞM; ð19Þ
C3 ¼ C31ðMÞþC32ðMÞM; C4 ¼ C41ðMÞþC42ðMÞM ð20Þ
where the C⋆⋆ coefﬁcients are assumed, for simplicity, piecewise
constant between Mach numbers of 10 different values, spanning
the ﬂight domain. The coefﬁcients are obtained using polynomial
regression, with least-squares ﬁt on a grid of parameter points.
The dynamic part of the elevator model is a function of the
elevator actual deﬂection ðδeÞ, aerodynamic force ðFaeroÞ, and sign of
elevator speed ðsignð _δeÞÞ, which makes the plant a parameter
dependent switched LPV system with three scheduling variables.
Different linearization techniques were applied to the nonlinear
actuator model, but standard techniques were not able to capture
the plant response properly. Responses of the models obtained with
analytical linearization (blue), and small perturbation method
(red dashed) are shown in Fig. 5. The small perturbation method,
Fig. 3. Possible fault sources of actuator servo-loop (denoted with red) (Goupil, 2010). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is
referred to the web version of this paper.)
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with a given initial deﬂection and constant aerodynamic force, is
not able to reproduce either the positive or the negative variance
from the trim point, while the analytical linearization fails only in
the positive deﬂection case. Despite the unsuccessful efforts it is
possible to obtain the structure of the underlying discrete time
dynamical system:
xkþ1 ¼
1 p1ðρÞ
1 0
 
xkþ
p2ðρÞ
0
 
uk
yk ¼
p3ðρÞ 0
1 0
0 2
2
64
3
75xkþ
0
0
p4ðρÞ
2
64
3
75ukþ
1
0
0
2
64
3
75f k ð21Þ
where the structure of the model is unchanged in every parameter
point, only the parameter values of p1; p2; p3; p4 are scheduled
with ρ¼ ½Faero; δe; signð _δeÞ, leading to a discrete time LPV system
(sampling time is set to 0.01 s). Grey-box identiﬁcation (Ljung, 1999)
based on the parameter estimation method (PEM) is used to
obtain the values of p1; p2; p3; p4 parameters at different schedul-
ing variable values of Faero ¼ ½10000 : 2000 : 10000N, δe ¼
½0:9δe;min : 0:1ðδe;minþδe;maxÞ : 0:9δe;max, signð _δeÞ ¼ ½1;1, repre-
senting a large part of the actuator operating domain. Using the
LTI models obtained with PEM (green dotted line in Fig. 5) almost
perfect match can be observed with the nonlinear response
(denoted with black). Using the LTI models at frozen parameter
values, the system can be casted into a polytopic LPV actuator
model. The model augmented with position and rate saturation,
coupled with the Faero scheduling parameter model, represents the
nonlinear model very accurately in a large part of the operating
envelope.
4. LPV FDI ﬁlter design for the aircraft
To compare the local and global model based approaches, the
two FDI ﬁlters are applied to the same aircraft model and cross
compared with each fault type to assess their detection perfor-
mance, including true detection, false alarm and missed detection
rates. The false alarm statistics is further challenged with off-
nominal ﬂight scenarios, when elevator faults are occurring during
the assessment of aileron FDI, and aileron faults occurring during
elevator assessment.
4.1. LPV FDI for aileron
A geometric LPV FDI ﬁlter (Szaszi et al., 2005) is designed for the
left inner aileron fault detection problem of the aircraft, which is
augmented with an H1 post ﬁlter to shape the residual. As
described above, load factor measurements are omitted from the
model, since the Dmatrix associated with these outputs is nonzero,
which makes the geometric FDI synthesis more complicated. The
resulting design model has 9 outputs, 15 inputs (including the three
fault directions and three wind gust disturbance directions) and 27
states, a relatively high state order includes actuator and sensor
dynamics. The LPV design model is scheduled with calibrated
airspeed and altitude, since after careful evaluation of the system
dynamics, mass and c.g. position are omitted from the scheduling
variables, due to their less signiﬁcant effect on the dynamics related
to aileron FDI.
The baseline geometric (FPRG) FDI ﬁlter obtained using the
methods developed in Balas et al. (2003) has 7 residual outputs,
Fig. 4. Model structure of the elevator actuator model, static nonlinearity of Faero on the left, actuator dynamics on the right.
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Fig. 5. Step response of elevator models obtained with different linearization
techniques and the nonlinear behavior, positive deﬂection (upper three), and
negative (lower three). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure
caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
B. Vanek et al. / Control Engineering Practice ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎6
Please cite this article as: Vanek, B., et al. Bridging the gap between theory and practice in LPV fault detection for ﬂight
control actuators. Control Engineering Practice (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conengprac.2014.05.002i
18 inputs, and 18 states. Since perfect decoupling is possible, the
parameter dependent transfer functions between elevator fault to
residuals and rudder fault to residuals are zero, while the residuals
all have nonzero response for aileron faults. To be able to augment
the FPRG ﬁlter with an H1 post ﬁlter using an output injection, as
shown in Fig. 1, the original 18 inputs of the system are augmented
by 18 additional inputs, each of them directly acting on one of the
18 states of the original FPRG ﬁlter. To pose an H1 optimization
problem for the post ﬁlter, a frozen point LTI plant from the LPV
aircraft model with a frozen point FPRG ﬁlter is augmented with
the design weights, as shown in Fig. 6. The list of design weights
are the following: Wu represents the uncertainty weights, Wdr is
responsible for the Dryden wind gust disturbance, sensor noise is
ﬁltered through Wd, while fault tracking error is penalized by We
and for well-posedness the pseudo-control signals of the H1 ﬁlter
are penalized by Wp. Fault tracking is achieved only in a limited
frequency range described by Tid.
The weights are chosen according to the following logic:
 Wu ¼ diagð0;wa;wa;wa;wa;wsp;we;wr ;weÞ corresponds to the
input uncertainty weights on the 9 input channels, where wa ¼
1:5ðsþ4Þ=ðsþ160Þ is the Aileron, we ¼ 0:75ðsþ20Þ=ðsþ200Þ is
the elevator and THS, wr ¼ 0:75ðsþ20Þ=ðsþ200Þ is the rudder,
wsp ¼ 2:25ðsþ4Þ=ðsþ160Þ is the spoiler uncertainty respectively,
where the elevator and the rudder have the lowest amount of
uncertainty, followed by ailerons and the highest value is asso-
ciated with spoilers, while engine inputs are considered perfect in
the present investigation. Higher amount of uncertainty is assumed
at higher frequencies corresponding to less knowledge of the
system dynamics in that frequency range.
 ‖Δa‖1r1 is a norm bounded structured uncertainty block on
the input channels, with the structure of diagð0;Δ44ail ;Δ11sp ;
Δ33tail Þ, representing uncertainty on ailerons, spoilers, and tail
surfaces respectively.
 Wdr is the moderate Dryden wind gust ﬁlter (probability of
exceedance is 103), according to MIL-HDBK-1797, with 240 kts
velocity and 533.4 feet wingspan.
 Wd ¼ 0:05I9 is a noise weighting ﬁlter on all 9 measurement
channels, corresponding to 0.05 rad and 0.05 rad/s noise for
magnitude and rate sensors respectively.
 Tid ¼ 0:25=ðs2þsþ0:25Þ is the ideal fault tracking behavior,
requiring a second-order 0.5 rad/s response which is tuned to
achieve a tradeoff between detection speed and disturbance
attenuation.
 We ¼ 1=ðsþ1Þ is a low pass ﬁlter which ensures fault response
tracking up to 1 rad/s, penalizing the difference between the
ideal fault reconstruction and the residual response.
 Wp ¼ 0:1I18 is a performance weighting function penalizing
the outputs of the H1 ﬁlter with weights on all pseudo-control
channels, required for well-posedness of the optimization.
The weighted interconnection with the FPRG ﬁlter included has
29 states, 26 outputs and 43 inputs, and the resultingH1 FDI ﬁlter,
not considering the effects of uncertainty Δa, has 7 measurements
and 19 control outputs. Combining the nominal LTI FPRG ﬁlter and
the LTI post ﬁlter results in a 30 states, 18 input and 1 output ﬁlter,
after computing minimal realization. In the benchmark simulation
the 18 states of the LPV FPRG ﬁlter are augmented with the 29
states of the H1 FDI post ﬁlter. It is important to note that a LPV
controller synthesis for the post ﬁlter would be computationally
too expensive. A good engineering compromise is made by
combining the algebraic solution for the LPV FPRG ﬁlter with an
LTI H1 ﬁlter to provide an LPV residual generator with reduced
computational complexity.
To analyze the performance of the aileron LPV FDI ﬁlter, it is
applied to the nonlinear aircraft model after taking the trim values
into consideration, on both control input and sensor output
signals. Since the simulation is implemented under SIMULINK with
a 0.01 s ﬁxed step size, the corresponding ﬁlters are also discre-
tized with the same sampling time using bilinear transformation.
It is also worth mentioning that the simulation is in closed-loop
with the ﬂight control system set to altitude and heading hold
mode and moderate atmospheric wind gust disturbances are
perturbing the aircraft ﬂight. For threshold selection purposes
the ﬁlter is applied to the nonlinear aircraft model at various
cruise conditions with appropriate trim scheduling with elevator
faults, to test the fault isolation properties. The left elevator drifts
from the commanded position with 51/s rate starting at 20 s.
The simulation starts from a typical ﬂight condition of 240 kts
and 26 000 ft, the c.g. position is xcg ¼ 0:3 and the weight is
200 000 kg, the data is normalised with physical deﬂection limits
on control surfaces and with maximum achieved aerodynamic
angles and angular rates in measurements, due to Airbus con-
ﬁdentiality reasons. The change in aircraft behavior is clearly
noticeable, a large pitch excursion can be seen in Fig. 7, while
the ﬂight control system counteracts with the adjacent elevator.
The LPV FDI residual reaches a value of 0.105 during the
manoeuvre, as seen in Fig. 8, indicating good fault decoupling
properties, hence the detection threshold is set with a safety factor
of 1.5–0.1051.5. The detection performance is analyzed on a left
inboard aileron jamming scenario, resulting in a bias on the rod
sensor at 20 s shifting the surface off from the commanded
position with a ﬁxed constant value. The ﬂight is at a representa-
tive cruise condition, with the moderate Dryden wind gust, and
off from the nominal FDI design condition: VCAS ¼ 200 kts and
h¼23 000 ft, xcg ¼ 0:3, and m¼200 000 kg. The detection time
performance (relative to the performance speciﬁcation of Airbus)
of 0.00508 is achieved with the LPV method and the fault
reconstruction performance is excellent, as shown in Fig. 9. Frozen
point LTI cases show a similar performance at the nominal design
point but their performance quickly degrades as ﬂight parameters
are departing from the design point, clearly indicating the advan-
tage of the LPV method.
The results are also validated in an industrially relevant func-
tional engineering simulator (FES) by Deimos Space S.L.U., where
the ﬁlter performance is assessed in a rigorous simulation cam-
paign, on a grid of ﬂight envelope with 710% uncertainty in
scheduling parameters of velocity, mass, altitude and c.g. position,
and in addition 75% uncertainty in aerodynamic coefﬁcients. 324
simulations are analyzed in total, where 158 cases do not lead the
aircraft out of the valid ﬂight envelope, and the ﬁlter achieved
0.0074 mean and 0.0314 maximum detection time performance,
while the true detection is 100%, with no false alarms and
missed detections. Fig. 10 shows the spread of ﬁlter residual
outputs (all of them normalised). Notice that the constant detec-
tion threshold derived above has to be changed to an adaptive
threshold scheduled with a roll rate (p), which uses a simple
lookup table as shown in Fig. 15, with low values at a low roll
rate and higher threshold at higher absolute values of the roll rate.
Fig. 6. Input multiplicative uncertainty case, weighted interconnection for H1
ﬁlter synthesis.
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The raw adaptive threshold is passed through a low pass ﬁlter of
Fthrs;ail ¼ 1=ðs2þ2sþ1Þ to avoid rapid changes, before compared
with the residual to form the fault diagnostic boolean value.
The ultimate test of the design is performed by Deimos Space
(project coordinator and industrial partner) using a more sophis-
ticated FES capable of benchmarking all the consortium designs in
equivalent conditions. A true Monte-Carlo campaign evaluated the
shortcomings of each design where 2200 valid runs are decom-
posed into two main cases: 1200 fault-free runs distributed evenly
among six benchmark-deﬁned ﬂight manoeuvres and 1000 runs
with faults at the ﬂight manoeuvre for the selected fault scenario
including solid-, liquid-jamming and disconnection (Goupil &
Marcos, 2012). The FPRG LPV design for the aileron scores a
detection performance maximum of 0.139, well below the speci-
ﬁcation of 1, with no false alarms and missed detections. These
results are obtained after one iteration of the implementation,
since the ﬁrst delivery of the code to Deimos Space contained a
software bug.
4.2. FDI ﬁlter design for the elevator
Simple parity relations can be formed using the elevator
actuator dynamics as described in Eq. (21). The main assumption
about the elevator runaway (or jamming) fault is that it acts on the
ﬁrst measured output only, which using Eq. (21) leads to
y1 ¼ p3ðρÞx1þ f 1 ð22Þ
while y2; y3 are unchanged and independent of f1, hence can be used
as parity equations. The fault acting on the plant can be expressed as
x2 ¼ 0:5ðy3p4ðρÞuÞ
f 1 ¼ y1p3ðρÞx1
Introducing the estimate of x^1 ¼ ξ1, still independent of f1, leads to the
relation of y^1, from which a residual (re) can be formed:
y^1 ¼ p3ðρÞξ1
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Fig. 7. Left elevator runaway scenario (VCAS ¼ 240 kts, h¼26 000 ft, xcg ¼ 0:3 and m¼200 000 kg), aircraft response, fault occurs at 20 s.
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_ξ1 ¼ ξ1þp1ðρÞð0:5y3þ0:5p4ðρÞuÞþp2ðρÞuλðξ1y2Þ
re ¼ y1p3ðρÞξ1 ð23Þ
where all three independent measurements are used to form the
residual, by introducing a reduced order state estimator for the system.
Since the system equations are used directly, the p⋆ðρÞ parameters
depending on Faero; δe; signð _δeÞ determine the ﬁlter equations, forming
an LPV observer. Only one design parameter ðλÞ has to be chosen to
achieve the desired detection time, which complies with industrial
practice to use tuning knobs which have physical meaning and to have
the fewest set of design tuning parameters. Since the proposed model
does not includemeasurement noise, but it is present in the real world
system, it is necessary to ﬁlter the residual (re), with an appropriately
chosen low pass ﬁlter, which is selected conservatively to Fres;elevðsÞ ¼
ð0:1=ðsþ0:1ÞÞ2. The last step in the detection framework is to set the
threshold on the residual magnitude for fault declaration, which is
selected based on a fault isolation problem, where the aileron is faulty
and the elevator FDI should not declare a false alarm (assuming a
safety factor of 50% in the elevator FDI case also). The proposed design
has only 3 tuneable design parameters which is very favorable from
industrial point of view.
The scenario under investigation is elevator jamming at 01
position in a turn coordination manoeuvre. The elevator com-
mands at the same nominal design point (VCAS ¼ 240 kts,
h¼26 000 ft, xcg ¼ 0:3 and m¼200 000 kg) are shown in Fig. 11,
which indicates a gentle reaction from the ﬂight control system,
since unlike in a runaway case the consequences of jamming are
not recognized immediately. The opposite side counteracts the
effect of the fault, but if the initial deﬂection of the elevator is also
around 01, the fault remains unobservable, until a longitudinal
maneuver starts. The performance of the ﬁlter is assessed in a
similar simulation campaign described above, at different ﬂight
envelope points, with 10% uncertainty on scheduling parameters
and 5% uncertainty on aerodynamic coefﬁcients. The simulation
consists of 158 valid runs, where the ﬂight control commands
spread a wide range, posing a difﬁcult task to simple ﬁltering
techniques with various initial conditions and transient behaviors.
In certain situations the elevator actuator is reaching its physical
deﬂection limit when a demanding pitching maneuver is com-
manded, hence it is important to augment the LPV model with the
saturation effects. Note that all the ﬁgures are normalized due to
Airbus conﬁdentiality reasons.
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Fig. 9. Left aileron liquid jamming scenario (VCAS ¼ 200 kts, h¼23 000 ft, xcg ¼ 0:3 and m¼200 000 kg), aircraft response, fault occurs at 20 s.
−20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
−0.07
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
Time (s)
di
ag
no
si
s 
ac
tu
at
or
 a
ili
g 
0
14
7
13
15
16
192223
25
683031394041
445
47505758606162
65
66
8
9
712
73475848
91
92
93
95
6
97
98
9109121 5
18
119
120
1 1
1 3
124
126127
128
303
34
36342
6902
551578161
664567816971
73
747
9
08125904
9902
203
5
6
2 7202 3
2 6
27
2
229
23
232
4
2 5
7
238
240
24
2 2
243
2
5246
47455
5
78
61
26345
66917357981828587
30310
Fig. 10. Filtered residual: aileron liquid jamming scenario, nominal behavior with
red and parametric run of 324 cases with blue (case number on the right), fault
occurs at 10 s. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption,
the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
B. Vanek et al. / Control Engineering Practice ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎ 9
Please cite this article as: Vanek, B., et al. Bridging the gap between theory and practice in LPV fault detection for ﬂight
control actuators. Control Engineering Practice (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conengprac.2014.05.002i
The measurements of elevator deﬂection in the jamming scenario
are shown in Fig. 12. The nominal ﬂight envelope trim point is plotted
with red, while the parametric simulation runs are plotted with blue,
where awide spectrum of initial actuator deﬂections can be seen up to
8 s, when suddenly the elevator shifts to 01 deﬂection, suffering from a
jamming fault. It is intuitive to see the occurrence of the fault given
the large number of simulation runs, however in the less extreme
cases the initial and faulty deﬂections are within the bounds of the
measurement noise. Elevator rod positionmeasurements are shown in
Fig. 13. Signals in the jamming case are closer to neutral position than
the signals if a runaway fault would occur, making jamming far more
challenging to detect. Although in the nominal design case a static
threshold is selected, in the more rigorous systematic simulation
campaign the threshold is changed to an adaptive one, which is
deﬂection command ðδCMDe Þ dependent (see Fig. 15). This is necessary,
since at larger deﬂections the model ﬁdelity is lower and saturation
effects might inﬂuence the precision also. To address the problem, the
threshold is held constant around small elevator commands and then
ramps up to higher values as commands are reaching the physical
limits of the actuator. In addition, to avoid rapid changes, the output
of the threshold function is ﬁltered with the a low pass ﬁlter of
Fthrs;elev ¼ 0:2=ðsþ0:2Þ.
The fault detection time in the elevator jamming case is longer
than in the aileron liquid jamming or runaway cases, since the
elevator is not deﬂected from the trim position until a manoeuvre
starts, which hides the effect of the fault. The residual response,
shown in Fig. 14 is more spread out and fault detection only occurs
when the aircraft is subjected to a manoeuvre requiring elevator
movement. Faults are detected in all 158 valid cases, with zero
false detection and missed detection rate is also zero, achieving
the required 100% true detection rate. The minimum detection
time performance is 0.0124, while the maximum is 0.049. The
large variation is due to the fact that the elevator is barely used
from 8 s to 10 s in most of the cases, until the maneuver starts, and
the difference between the original deﬂection and the faulty
deﬂection with jamming is minimal. However, since the jamming
scenario is less critical than runaway, longer detection time is
allowed according to the speciﬁcations, which is the reason of
excellent detection time performance.
The ultimate test of the design for the elevator FDI is performed
similarly to the aileron FDI assessment, by Deimos Space using a
benchmarking FES on a set of 2200 valid runs decomposed into
two main cases: 1200 fault-free runs distributed evenly among six
benchmark-deﬁned ﬂight maneuvers and 1000 runs with faults at
the default ﬂight maneuver for the selected elevator jamming fault
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Fig. 11. Right elevator jamming scenario (VCAS ¼ 240 kts, h¼26 000 ft, xcg ¼ 0:3 and m¼200 000 kg), aircraft response at a single ﬂight point, fault occurs at 8 s.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (s)
R
ig
ht
 e
le
va
to
r d
ef
le
ct
io
n 
se
ns
or
 (n
or
m
al
iz
ed
)
01473569228301475689 9258013467
Fig. 12. Elevator deﬂection sensor: right elevator jamming scenario, nominal
behavior with red and parametric run of 324 cases with blue (case number on
the right), fault occurs at 8 s. (For interpretation of the references to color in this
ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
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at 01. The LPV detection ﬁlter based design for the elevator scored
a detection performance maximum of 0.046, well below the
speciﬁcation of 1, with no false alarms and missed detections.
These results are obtained after no iteration of the implementation
showing the beneﬁt of advanced model-based design.
5. Implementation aspects of LPV FDI ﬁlters
The main difﬁculty in designing highly complex algorithms
for fault detection lies in the implementation, since all software
implemented on the ﬂight control computers (FCC) has to be
certiﬁed. Most often the FDI ﬁlters are designed in continuous
time, with limited attention to real-time aspects and relying on
strict modeling assumptions such as perfect knowledge of trim
values, no quantization and delay on signals. On the other hand
the FCCs have limited computational capability and the ﬁlters
might need some tuning on-site by an engineering expert, espe-
cially with respect to their threshold functions. For this reason, it is
advantageous if a design method have tuning knobs with which
the performance can be tuned according to the speciﬁcations in a
transparent manner, without full knowledge of the underlying
theory.
In the ﬁnal implementation, when the theory is applied to a
real world, highly complex, fully nonlinear system the original
design assumptions often fail and more conservative approaches
or additional tuning parameters have to be introduced. The
thresholding functions in both local and global approaches have
to be scheduled, as described above, and increased leading to more
conservative results, to accommodate for the differences in model
ﬁdelity around different points of the operating envelope. The
choice of adaptive threshold with the appropriate scheduling
variable and magnitude of it across the scheduling range requires
engineering insight and trial and error type tuning. Hence the
number of tuning parameters in the two cases are difﬁcult to
estimate, since important design choices have to be made regard-
ing the model generation and sometimes, in the weighting
functions even the number of parameters are a part of the design
decisions. But it is safe to say that the global model based method
requires signiﬁcantly more engineering insight and roughly 20
tuning parameters, while the detection ﬁlter based local method
requires only tuning of 10 design variables.
It is also important to note that LTI and LPV models require careful
trim routines and in the ﬁnal implementation not only the detection
ﬁlter matrices have to be scheduled with the ﬂight parameters, but
also the measurements and commands have to be compensated with
their trim values, which are available from the ﬂight control system.
Further difﬁculty is to be compliant with the Aerospatiale graphic
language SAO (Speciﬁcation Assistee par Ordinateur) (Briere &
Traverse, 1993; Spitzer, 2001). Software algorithms have to be coded
with a limited set of elementary blocks. This reduces the precision of
the computations, for example in the elevator FDI case, the parameter
dependent matrices have to be interpolated with a 66 lookup-table.
Implementation aspects have to take into account discrete switching
behavior, often encountered in highly complex architectures such as
the ﬂy-by-wire system, related to managing ﬂight control system
resources. In initial cold start of the FCCs the ﬁlter residuals require at
least 2–3 s to settle down, while the fault detection residual must be
set to zero artiﬁcially. A similar transient behavior has to be handled in
cases when one FCC becomes active from standby mode, or when the
ﬂight control law switches from normal to alternate law.
As stated above both global and local detection methods
achieved full detection performance, with no false alarms and no
missed detections. Their detection time performance characteris-
tics differ only due to the different speciﬁcations on the aileron
and elevator scenarios. Their fundamental difference lies in
the implementation aspects, since both ﬁlters have to be coded
with SAO sheets and the engineers implementing them on ﬂight
certiﬁed hardware would like to be aware of the number of tuning
parameters and their effect on the performance. The implementa-
tion of the local FDI algorithmwith SAO blocks uses 75 elementary
blocks, while the execution time is 21% of the allocated maximum.
On the other hand the complex global model based FDI ﬁlter uses
2159 elementary blocks and the execution time is 459% of the
maximum allowed, which seems high, but there is a clear need for
global model based methods, since certain FDI problems cannot be
solved with local methods due to the lack of analytical redun-
dancy. Hence, within the next generation of FCCs the available
computational power have to increase to take into account the
computational needs of FDI methods.
A similar design decision is the sampling time of the implementa-
tions. Using a 50 Hz version of the elevator FDI ﬁlter showed 0.0496
maximum detection time performance (vs. 0.049 of the original
100 Hz one), but the 25 Hz version has unacceptable performance
with higher than 1 maximum detection time performance.
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6. Conclusion
The present paper detailed the development steps of two
inherently different design methods to detect aircraft actuator
faults. Although the methods are different, their ﬁnal industrial
evaluation resulted in a similar performance. The main difference
between them is the computational load, which clearly favors the
local model based methods. However in many situations when a
limited set of measurements are available, the local methods may
be infeasible and the present paper shows that even a method
based on a 6-DOF aircraft model with a high number of states can
be implemented with a reasonable amount of software code, and
despite its complexity can perform ﬂawlessly in the industrial
evaluation, while the computational capabilities of the next gen-
eration of ﬂight control computers will enable the use of such
methods.
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